Monday, October 16, 2006

Fear of Risk

There is a post mortem going on about the performance of the Israeli Army in the recent war in Lebanon. This particular report deals with the performance of 91st Division.

An interim Israel Defense Forces investigative report to the failures of the army during the war in Lebanon was delivered on Sundays to the chief of staff and the General Staff Forum, points out major deficiencies in the performance of IDF's 91st division and its commander, Brigadier General Gal Hirsch.
Let us start out with the good news.
One positive point which stems from the report is the individual performance of the battalions and companies which came in direct contact with Hizbullah. The results of these battles were all in favor of the IDF soldiers.
So despite the difficulties the IDF was cleaning Hizballah's clock.

Now for the bad news.
The positive comments, however, end there. The investigation raises major problems with the issues of battle management, its purpose and its objectives. One major problem reported by the investigators was the attitude towards the mission. According to the report, the officers and soldiers treated the fighting in Lebanon as a normal security incident and not as a war, including in the field, despite the fact that the senior officers and the general staff had said that they are indeed in a war.
What does that mean? Probably that the wartime rules of engagement were not fully implimented. Too much concern for civilian casualties and collateral damage at the expense of the lives of Israeli soldiers.
The missions were not articulated clearly especially in two parameters: the purpose and the timeframe for the missions. Instead, only the objectives of the missions were defined clearly. This resulted in vagueness and inability to assess the results of the missions.

Frequent mission changes: the investigation found that the missions and orders were changed too frequently for the forces to prepare adequately. The missions were articulated in writing, phone, or radio, which contributed to the confusion, and mistrust among the command.
Clear orders and definite objectives are essential in implimenting the commanders intent.

Probably some of the confusioin of changing orders could not be avoided due to Hizballah's ability to capture and decode Israeli communications. This can be fixed by improving security.
Inconsistency in managing the battles caused areas which were controlled by the IDF to be abandoned, only to be conquered again. There were extreme changes in the intensity of the battle moving from long periods of waiting to intense periods of activity in very tight schedules which caused confusion among the commanders. The battle orders were also not delivered clearly to the forces, a fact which did not allow the forces to maximize their firepower and use it efficiently.
Again the problem is one of understanding the commanders intent. Or of the commanders having no definite intent which would be much more serious.

As to changes in tempo and general confusion: absolutely normal in warfare. Hurry up and wait is so normal in armed forces that normally it is not at all remarkable except for the griping of the soldiers. This points to a lack of training.

Now comes probably the worst indictment of the officer corps. Any officer corps.
As to the location of the brigade commanders, only the commander of the paratrooper's brigade chose to command the forces from within the battlefield, even when the forces had suffered losses and there was a need for that. Among the battalion commanders, that phenomenon was less prevalent, but did find some instances where the commanders chose to be outside of the battlefield.
They teach you over and over in good militaries that leadership is not just giving orders. It is sharing danger with your men and seeing how things are going first hand. Without that kind of leadership armies become reluctant to close with the enemy. The officer corps loses the trust of the soldiers.
On the logistical side, the report indicates that the division was unaware that there were tanks and bulldozers without fuel. In addition, the report indicates that there was not enough done to open logistical corridors into the forces. The brigades also did not prioritize the formation of logistical corridors. The report indicates that most of the logistical solutions were a result of improvisation.
Logistics is the heart and soul of a modern military. Improvisation is good. Planning is better.
The report also indicated that the commanders of the division did not stick to the mission and did not show determination because they were afraid to take risks, logistical problems, and lack of preparedness of the force.

The report also indicated problems in the area of the so called "IDF spirit" which calls for constant contact with the enemy, determination, and personal risk taking for the name of the mission. In that area, the report indicated that the commanders acted timidly and did not wish to expand the mission and take the necessary responsibility.

The report also indicates deficiencies in the training of the forces and their professional readiness, which caused a problem in the way they performed in battle
All warfare is about calculated risk. Timidity in the officer corps is a very serious problem. It means the inability to take advantage of situations as they arise.

The lack of constant contact allows the enemy to regroup. This makes the fighting harder and the losses higher.

I have blamed the timidy on Israeli culture. Particularly its economic culture of Socialism. Socialism is about avoiding risk. Capitalism is at its heart a risk taking economic culture. Time for a change.

7 comments:

Abu Nopal said...

on the contrary, I blame capitalism, for providing israeli society with such a high standard of living that the officers have become soft and distracted.

but more seriously, the occupation has created an economy of action, since it breeds the assumption that conflicts never end. The IDF is out of practice in the area of all out war.

M. Simon said...

Abu,

How do you explain the American officer corps which seems to understand leadership? America is much richer per capita than Israel. Mostly.

Abu Nopal said...

simple. Americans don't know how to enjoy life as much. Israelis are capable of being made completely giddy on far less absolute wealth. seriously.

linearthinker said...

Scapegoating. Predictable, given the format for the review and the refusal of Olmert to submit to independent appraisal. Set the rules and the review reaches predetermined outcomes. PM, DM, and Chief of Staff levels above the fray. Been there, done that. Waste of time. In my case the issues weren't as existential as in this case. Just my job was at stake. Eyewash and pablum and move along...nothing to see.

...officers and soldiers treated the fighting in Lebanon as a normal security incident and not as a war.

This is essentially what their training had emphasized for the last couple of years. Ummm. Who sets the training priorities? The Division Morale Officer? You decide. This is what senior officers have been cashiered for complaining about. Enforcing withdrawal from the settlements and outposts wasn't going to be easy, or popular, afterall. Nasty work, but someone had to do it. You respond in action the way you've been trained, not the way you've been indoctrinated with "IDF spirit", especially when no one can find the asshats who issued the nebulous "objectives."

...The missions were not articulated clearly especially in two parameters: the purpose and the timeframe for the missions. Instead, only the objectives of the missions were defined clearly. This resulted in vagueness and inability to assess the results of the missions.

This is laughable as a critique. Notice the emphasis on only the objectives of the mission (being) defined clearly, while other operational factors were dissed? The two elements of purpose and timeframe can only be translated into concise operational orders when the objective is clearly transmitted to the field. Period. Anyone who believes this fairytale about the alleged incompetence of the division's operations staff needs to do some studying on the basics of command and control, and I exclude the division staff from that observation.

...Frequent mission changes: the investigation found that the missions and orders were changed too frequently for the forces to prepare adequately.

Again, training for the wrong scenarios. National defense priorities managed by a socialist plumbers' union boss, if I'm not mistaken.

...The missions were articulated in writing, phone, or radio, which contributed to the confusion, and mistrust among the command.

Again, laughable as a critique. Who do they get to write this crap? Ummm? How does one relay the missions except by writing, phoning, or radio? Are we to believe the IDF is so incompetent, or is there some spin going on here?

...confusion and mistrust among the command?
Probably the first true words uttered.
Consider, if you will, an exchange between platoon leader and platoon sergeants just before the assault toward the Litani River.
Plt ldr: Olmert's ordered us to move north as fast and as far as we can. We leave in 30 minutes.
Plt sgts: (in unison) Yea!
Plt ldr: Oh, yeah. I almost forgot. Olmert said he's going before the Knesset tomorrow and recommending a vote in favor of the UN ceasefire proposal. Any questions?
Plt sgts: (in unison) What the fuck?

...The report also indicates deficiencies in the training of the forces and their professional readiness, which caused a problem in the way they performed in battle.

No kidding. They trained for the wrong battle. Whose fault is that? Peretz, who told them which battle to train for? Or the division staff? You decide.

...Timidity in the officer corps is a very serious problem.

Especially when those who rise to the top, like scum on sewage, are those who go along to get along, while their outspoken fellow officers who criticize the fallacies being committed are punished.

M. Simon said...

linearthinker,

Excellent.

linearthinker said...

As to the location of the brigade commanders, only the commander of the paratrooper's brigade chose to command the forces from within the battlefield, even when the forces had suffered losses and there was a need for that.

Look at the total area of the "battlefield" for a moment, and consider the nature of the enemy and the fighting. What would have been the consequences of a brigade hq section being overrun by the Hez, and what demands on troop resources to secure that nerve center would have been required? That the airborne brigade's commander commanded from within the battlefield is expected. That's how it's done if you're a paratrooper. This was a month of skirmishs within a stone's throw of the border with no objective provided from the government to capture and hold ground until the waning hours of the campaign, and then with the feckless addendum that Olmert was dancing on the threshold of knuckling under to Condi and Coffee. It was an unconventional battle conducted under world scrutiny with an adverse media second guessing every move.

I'll spare y'all my parsing of the rest of the exerpts from the "performance review." All the report's whining about logistic screwups and tactical failures can be analyzed under two headings: (1) the nature of warfare, i.e. the plan is good for the first few hours, after which you had better be prepared to improvise; and (2)there has to be a plan in the first place. If the plan was fluid, and developed over time, that's fair. But, don't judge the combat units by standards of conventional warfare when you've sent them to conduct an operation that requires different tactics. It appears this confusion of assessment standards underpins the whole report.

M. Simon said...

My take is that if paratroopers get commanded from the battle field so should the rest of the Army.

One charachteristic of great generals is they command from the front.

Rommel, Patton, etc.

Maybe not feasible at the highest echelons these days, but certainly for brigade commanders.

Personally I think (these days)the main war effort was destruction of Hizballah assets and the ground war was a diversion with side benefits.

i.e. it did not need to be done well. It was a live fire exercise. Which is one reason to rotate in more troops than actual fighting demanded.

How you rate the upper echelons depends on what you think the actual goals were.

In siege warfare the most important thing to do is not destroy enemy forces. It is to destroy enemy assets. Having an Air Force General run the show makes sense.

Still deficiencies in all manner of execution need correcting.

Tanks stalled due to lack of fuel is a huge screw up. One reason to hold open a corridor is to keep the enemy away from the soft skinned stuff. I believe I mentioned this early in the war. That the soft skinned stuff would be a target. i.e. let the Israelis advance with minimal opposition. Then attack the supply convoys.

I can see how retaking the ground could be disheartening. I'd like to know if different units took the same ground. That would make sense from a training perspective.

The bit about the wrong training: yep.