Fear of Risk

There is a post mortem going on about the performance of the Israeli Army in the recent war in Lebanon. This particular report deals with the performance of 91st Division.

An interim Israel Defense Forces investigative report to the failures of the army during the war in Lebanon was delivered on Sundays to the chief of staff and the General Staff Forum, points out major deficiencies in the performance of IDF's 91st division and its commander, Brigadier General Gal Hirsch.

Let us start out with the good news.

One positive point which stems from the report is the individual performance of the battalions and companies which came in direct contact with Hizbullah. The results of these battles were all in favor of the IDF soldiers.

So despite the difficulties the IDF was cleaning Hizballah's clock.

Now for the bad news.

The positive comments, however, end there. The investigation raises major problems with the issues of battle management, its purpose and its objectives. One major problem reported by the investigators was the attitude towards the mission. According to the report, the officers and soldiers treated the fighting in Lebanon as a normal security incident and not as a war, including in the field, despite the fact that the senior officers and the general staff had said that they are indeed in a war.

What does that mean? Probably that the wartime rules of engagement were not fully implimented. Too much concern for civilian casualties and collateral damage at the expense of the lives of Israeli soldiers.

The missions were not articulated clearly especially in two parameters: the purpose and the timeframe for the missions. Instead, only the objectives of the missions were defined clearly. This resulted in vagueness and inability to assess the results of the missions.

Frequent mission changes: the investigation found that the missions and orders were changed too frequently for the forces to prepare adequately. The missions were articulated in writing, phone, or radio, which contributed to the confusion, and mistrust among the command.

Clear orders and definite objectives are essential in implimenting the commanders intent.

Probably some of the confusioin of changing orders could not be avoided due to Hizballah's ability to capture and decode Israeli communications. This can be fixed by improving security.

Inconsistency in managing the battles caused areas which were controlled by the IDF to be abandoned, only to be conquered again. There were extreme changes in the intensity of the battle moving from long periods of waiting to intense periods of activity in very tight schedules which caused confusion among the commanders. The battle orders were also not delivered clearly to the forces, a fact which did not allow the forces to maximize their firepower and use it efficiently.

Again the problem is one of understanding the commanders intent. Or of the commanders having no definite intent which would be much more serious.

As to changes in tempo and general confusion: absolutely normal in warfare. Hurry up and wait is so normal in armed forces that normally it is not at all remarkable except for the griping of the soldiers. This points to a lack of training.

Now comes probably the worst indictment of the officer corps. Any officer corps.

As to the location of the brigade commanders, only the commander of the paratrooper's brigade chose to command the forces from within the battlefield, even when the forces had suffered losses and there was a need for that. Among the battalion commanders, that phenomenon was less prevalent, but did find some instances where the commanders chose to be outside of the battlefield.

They teach you over and over in good militaries that leadership is not just giving orders. It is sharing danger with your men and seeing how things are going first hand. Without that kind of leadership armies become reluctant to close with the enemy. The officer corps loses the trust of the soldiers.

On the logistical side, the report indicates that the division was unaware that there were tanks and bulldozers without fuel. In addition, the report indicates that there was not enough done to open logistical corridors into the forces. The brigades also did not prioritize the formation of logistical corridors. The report indicates that most of the logistical solutions were a result of improvisation.

Logistics is the heart and soul of a modern military. Improvisation is good. Planning is better.

The report also indicated that the commanders of the division did not stick to the mission and did not show determination because they were afraid to take risks, logistical problems, and lack of preparedness of the force.

The report also indicated problems in the area of the so called "IDF spirit" which calls for constant contact with the enemy, determination, and personal risk taking for the name of the mission. In that area, the report indicated that the commanders acted timidly and did not wish to expand the mission and take the necessary responsibility.

The report also indicates deficiencies in the training of the forces and their professional readiness, which caused a problem in the way they performed in battle

All warfare is about calculated risk. Timidity in the officer corps is a very serious problem. It means the inability to take advantage of situations as they arise.

The lack of constant contact allows the enemy to regroup. This makes the fighting harder and the losses higher.

I have blamed the timidy on Israeli culture. Particularly its economic culture of Socialism. Socialism is about avoiding risk. Capitalism is at its heart a risk taking economic culture. Time for a change.